

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

## INFORMATION REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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This is UNEVALUATED Information

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.  
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.  
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE).

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1. In the production of electric power, Bulgaria has occupied one of the last positions among the countries of Europe. Prior to 1944, electrical energy production scarcely reached 108,000,000 kilowatt hours annually (power input approximately 50,000 kilowatts). About 44.5 kilowatt hours were available to each inhabitant per year. Only 15 percent of the Bulgarian towns were supplied with electricity.
2. One of the major problems of the Communist Government has been, and still is, to electrify the hydroelectric and thermoelectric industries because of Bulgaria's backwardness in this respect and also to establish the basis for the creation of new industries. The Government has placed strong propaganda emphasis on this factor, but it should be kept in mind that the problem is very simple because of the abundance of raw materials:
  - a. Coal deposits for the thermoelectric industry; and
  - b. The great abundance of ~~rapid~~ rivers for the hydroelectric industry.
3. According to statements of the Communist Government, power was doubled in the 1947-1948 biennial plan. The Five-Year Plan envisions a power production of 1,800,000,000 kilowatt hours (power input 720,000 kilowatts) in 1953, which is 20 times the 1944 production.
4. In 1948, upon a measure passed by the Council of Ministers, the three following enterprises were instituted for regulating the electrical industry:
  - a. Energo-Obedinenie, union for the production, transport, and distribution of the electrical industry;
  - b. Elprom, State enterprise for the electrical industry; and
  - c. Energohidrostoi, State enterprise for the construction, maintenance, and improvement of power stations.

25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

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STATE	X	ARMY	EV	X	NAVY	X	AIR	EV	X	FBI		AEC		ORR	EV	X
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(Note: Washington Distribution Indicated By "X"; Field Distribution By "#".)

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## 5. Official statements have revealed the following data:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Power Input</u>	<u>Power Production</u>	<u>Amount per Capita</u>
Prior to 1944	(43,200 kw)	108,000,000 Kw/h	44.5 Kw/h per year
1947	1190,000 kw	480,000,000 Kw/h	
1950	(350,000 kw)	1,400,000,000 Kw/h	
1953	(720,000 kw)	1,800,000,000 Kw/h	

NOTE: The figures in parenthesis of power input in kilowatts are derived from approximate figures for comparison purposes. [ ] plants, for each kilowatt of power input produce an average of 2,500 to 3,000 kilowatt hours per year.)

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6. From the evidence at hand as of December 1952, it may be said that the figures issued by the Bulgarian Government are theoretically accurate, but from a practical standpoint, it must be considered that all the plants are either newly created units or improvements of old plants and that the output cannot be as great as it would be if the training and technique of the personnel were at optimum efficiency.

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7. As of the end of December 1952, the following plants were known to be in existence or under construction, as indicated:

## a. Thermoelectric plants in operation:

<u>No.</u>	<u>Plant Name</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Capacity in Kw.</u>
1		Vidin (N 44-00, E 22-51)	---
2		Ruse (N 43-50, E 25-57)	---
3		Dolna Oryakhovitsa (N 43-10, E 25-44)	10,000
4		Kurilo (N 42-50, E 23-19)	60,000
5	Vasil Kolarov	Burgas	---
6	Marinov	Dimitrovgrad	60,000
7	Maritsa III or Vulko Chervenkov	Dimitrovgrad	25,000
8	Nadezhda or Stalin	Sofia	150,000
9	TETs Republika	Pernik (N 42-36, E 23-03, now Dimitrovo)	250,000
10	Dimitrovo	Pernik	60,000

## b. Thermoelectric plants under construction:

<u>No.</u>	<u>Plant Name</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Capacity in Kw.</u>	<u>To Begin Operating</u>
1	Maritsa II	Dimitrovgrad	250,000	1955

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## c. Hydroelectric plants in operation:

<u>No.</u>	<u>Dam</u>	<u>Plant Name</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Capacity in Kw.</u>
21		Vidima	Vidin (N 44-00, E 22-51)	(10)
22		Kitka	Gorni Lom (N 43-29, E 22-44)	40,000
23	Rila Planina	Mala Tsurkva	Mala Tsurkva (N 42-16, E 23-32)	50,000
24	Pancharevo	Pancharevo Simeonovo	Pancharevo (N 42-35, E 23-25) Simeonovo (N 42-36, E 23-20)	25,000 15,000
25	Boyana	Boyana	Boyana (N 42-39, E 23-16)	20,000
26	Batanovtsi	Batanovtsi	Batanovtsi (N 42-37, E 22-57)	20,000
27	Gorno Uyno	Gorno Uyno	Gorno Uyno (N 42-25, E 22-34)	40,000
28	Rila	Pastra Rila	Pastra (N 42-08, E 23-13) Rila (N 42-08, E 23-08)	40,000 40,000
29	Rila	Barakovo	Barakovo (N 42-04, E 23-04)	20,000
30	Mezdra	Mezdra	Mezdra (N 43-09, E 23-40)	30,000
31	Strupets	Strupets	Strupets (N 43-08, E 23-53)	15,000
32	Lukovit	Lukovit	Lukovit (N 43-12, E 24-10)	15,000
33	Teteven	Teteven	Teteven (N 42-54, E 24-16)	30,000
34	Vasil Kolarov	Vucha	Plovdiv	100,000
35	Krichim	Krichim	Krichim (N 42-03, E 24-26)	---
36	Boykovo	Boykovo	Boykovo (N 41-59, E 24-37)	15,000
37	Chernogorovo	Chernogorovo	Chernogorovo (N 42-16, E 24-24)	20,000
38	Karlovo	I II	Karlovo (N 42-38, E 24-49) Karlovo	25,000 25,000
39	Asenovgrad	Asenitsa Chaya	Asenitsa (sic, near Asenovgrad N 41-59, E 24-52) Chaya (sic, near Asenovgrad)	25,000 15,000
40	Beli Izvor	Beli Izvor	Beli Izvor (N 41-32, E 25-04)	---
41	Gabrovo	Gabrovo	Gabrovo (N 42-52, E 25-19)	---
42	Belene	Belene	Belene (N 43-40, E 25-06)	---
43	Enina	Enina	Enina (N 42-40, E 25-25)	---
44	Stara Zagora	Stara Zagora	Stara Zagora (N 42-25, E 25-38)	15,000
45	Devnya	Devnya	Devnya (N 43-13, E 27-33)	25,000
46	Razlog	Razlog	Razlog (N 41-53, E 23-27)	50,000

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## d. Hydroelectric plants under construction:

No.	Dam	Plant Name and Location	Capacity in Kw.
51	Studena	Studena (N 42-32, E 23-08)	100,000
52	Panichishte	Panichishte (sic, in the Dupnitsa area N 42-15, E 23-06)	30,000
53	Stalin	Stalin (near N 42-32, E 23-30) Pancharevo (N 42-35, E 23-25) Boyana (N 42-39, E 23-16)	80,000 40,000 40,000
54	Klisura	Petrokhan (N 43-07, E 23-07) Burzia Klisura (N 43-12, E 23-09)	--- --- ---
55			
56	Karas	Karas (sic, possibly near Svoge, N 42-58, E 23-20 or Durantsi, N 43-07, E 23-42)	80,000
57	Kalugerovo	Mukhovo (N 42-24, E 23-58) Lesichevo (N 42-20, E 24-06) Kalugerovo (N 42-18, E 24-11)	125,000 80,000 80,000
58		Devlin (N 41-45, E 24-24)	10,000
59		Ustovo (N 41-34, E 24-48)	---
60	Lulyakovo	(Possibly in area of Rashovo Konare, N 42-20, E 24-48)	35,000
61	Rostrol (Rositsa)	I (Savlievo area N 42-56, E 25-08) II	140,000 120,000
62	Georgi Dimitrov	Kazanluk (N 42-37, E 25-24) Stara Zagora (N 42-25, E 25-38)	100,000 140,000

Comment: It is believed that there has been a fundamental change in Bulgarian strategic planning. There is a tendency to draw armed forces previously located close to the southern and western frontiers toward the trans-Planina area of the Bulgarian Dobrudzha, centering on Shumen. This area, which previously served as a strategic reserve to the forces located along the southern and eastern frontiers, now appears to be becoming a primary defensive area. It could be said, briefly, that while previously the Bulgarian location of forces was favorable to the development of an offensive in the direction of Thrace and Greek and Yugoslav Macedonia, at present the emphasis appears to be upon the assumption of a defensive posture. Concerning the connection between these military developments and the foregoing report, there is evidence of an obvious design to build up the availability of electrical resources in precisely the area of northeastern Bulgaria discussed in this comment. An evaluation of these developments is requested.

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